We analyse a bargaining game in which one party, called the buyer, has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with other participants, called sellers. When the sequencing of negotiations is confidential and the sellers' goods are highly complementary, efficient, non-dissipative equilibria exist in which the buyer randomizes over negotiation sequences. In these equilibria, the buyer can obtain higher pay-offs than in pure strategy equilibria or in public negotiations. The degree of sequencing uncertainty that maximizes buyer pay-offs is inversely related to the aggregate bargaining power of the sellers.
INTRODUCTION
Bargaining situations, in which a dealmaker sequentially makes offers to some potential acceptors while leaving others "in the dark", are common in business and economics. Consider the following situations: a stock-market arbitrager trying to confidentially buy up large blockholders in order to secure a toehold stake in a firm, a real estate developer attempting to secretly buy property from landowners, or a politician attempting to gather the last few votes necessary to form a ruling coalition. All these buyers face the same problem of sequencing negotiations with multiple agents. Moreover, in each case, only the buyer has complete information on terms of the deals struck with the other parties. This paper develops a strategic model of bargaining and negotiation which captures these stylized situations.
In our model, negotiations are between a buyer and several strategic sellers. The buyer is the only agent that can initiate negotiations and communication. We consider two cases. In the first case, our benchmark case, sellers know the entire history of past negotiations when they negotiate with the buyer. We call this case the public negotiations case. The second case, which we term the confidential negotiations case, is the focus of our analysis. In this case, the buyer monopolizes information. Sellers only know the offers they receive. They do not know anything about the outcomes of negotiations with other sellers. Our aim is to determine how the buyer's strategy of sequencing negotiations, both public and confidential, affects his pay-off in the negotiations.
We first consider the two-seller case and call the first seller negotiated with the "first seller" and the second seller negotiated with the "second seller". We initiate our analysis by considering the case of efficient equilibria (i.e. equilibria in which both sales are consummated on the equilibrium path). Because, on the equilibrium path, negotiations with the first seller always succeed and the second seller has correct beliefs, the pay-off to the second seller in confidential negotiations is the same as her pay-off in public negotiations. Even though failure never occurs in equilibrium, what the second seller would obtain, or equivalently what the buyer would receive, were the first negotiation to fail, is a key determinant of buyer pay-offs. The more the buyer receives when the first negotiation fails, the stronger his bargaining position is against the first seller. If negotiations are confidential, the reservation demands of the second seller are independent of the actual play of the first negotiation. If negotiations are public, then demands in the second negotiation adjust in response to the change in buyer valuations resulting from the outcome of the first negotiation. Thus the buyer's pay-offs after the failure of the first public negotiation are different from his pay-offs after the failure of the first confidential negotiation.
If the goods are substitutes, failing to buy one good raises the marginal value of the other good to the buyer and makes the buyer more anxious to strike a deal in the second. However, with confidential negotiations, this increase in the buyers' marginal valuation is not observed because failure is not observed. Thus, confidential negotiations produce higher buyer pay-offs. As the goods move from substitutes to complements, the situation changes. If complementarity is weak, the second seller will still consummate a deal with the buyer regardless of the outcome of the first negotiation. Thus, payments to the second seller are sunk from the perspective of the buyer and the first seller. At the same time, the failure of the first negotiation reduces the buyer's willingness to pay in the second negotiation. Thus, we obtain the mirror image of the substitutes case: observed failure ratchets down the demands of the second seller conditioned on failure, improving the buyer's bargaining position against the first seller and thus reducing overall buyer payments to sellers. Public negotiations produce higher buyer pay-offs than confidential negotiations when the buyer follows a fixed negotiating sequence. When complementarity reaches a high level, the confidential negotiation game changes in a fundamental manner: Now, when the first negotiation fails, the value of the second good to the buyer is less than the reservation demand of its seller (who did not observe the first negotiation's failure). Hence, the second negotiation will fail if the first fails. Thus, payments to the second seller are no longer sunk from the perspective of the buyer and the first seller. These payments depend on the success of the first negotiation. For this reason, prospective payments now determine the marginal value of reaching the first agreement. These prospective payments are determined endogenously by the (perhaps random) sequencing strategy of the buyer, with the buyer's pay-off maximized in equilibria featuring uniform randomization across negotiation sequences. Thus, sequencing strategy matters and, when complementarity is sufficiently great, confidential negotiations produce the highest buyer pay-off.
From our examination of the two-seller case, it is clear that the most "interesting" region of the parameter space from the perspective of examining negotiation strategy is the region where complementarity is high. Moreover, over this region, one might as well assume complementarity is perfect. What is less clear is whether the optimality of uniform randomization is a general conclusion or the artefact of the two-seller framework. To address this question, we next develop an N -seller model under the assumption of perfect complementarity. This model shows that, in fact, optimal sequencing strategy in general is much more complex than what the two-seller model would indicate. When the aggregate bargaining power of sellers becomes large, uniform randomization loses its appeal to the buyer. When the buyer adopts the uniform randomization sequencing strategy, each seller has the option of either holding out for moderate payments from the buyer that allow the buyer to pay off all the other sellers and still earn a profit, or holding out for large payments that are based on the expected value of rejecting the buyer's initial offer and gambling on a counter-offer that will be accepted along only some negotiation sequences and will trigger negotiation failure along others. When the bargaining power of other sellers is large, moderate demands that accommodate other sellers become very small. Thus, aggressive, large-demand strategies become more viable. As the aggregate bargaining power of sellers increases, satisfying these large demands becomes impossible and uniform randomization even loses viability as an equilibrium strategy.
When this occurs, the equilibria preferred by the buyer feature a sequencing which "optimizes" seller uncertainty: first, the buyer chooses a small subgroup of sellers and randomizes across the order in which he approaches sellers in this subgroup. Next, he proceeds in a random but asymmetric fashion to another subgroup of sellers, then repeats the randomization procedure. Grouping is optimal even though the sellers are identical ex ante. Because grouping induces asymmetric pay-offs, this result also implies that heterogeneity in seller pay-offs increases in average seller bargaining power. However, despite the change in the nature of the optimal sequencing strategy engendered by the increase in the number of sellers, in the N -player game under perfect complementarity, confidential negotiations produce higher buyer pay-offs than public negotiations.
Our research is related to an extensive literature on bargaining games. In order to draw out these relations, it is useful first to define the dimensions of comparison. The key dimension for classifying bargaining models, from the perspective of rating the contribution of this paper, is the kind of contracts that can be proposed. In "N -player bargaining models", unanimous and simultaneous consent is required for agreement. Bargaining specifies an allocation for all the players at the same time, and any one seller can veto the buyer's proposed allocations. In a symmetric information context, Chae and Yang (1994) and Krishna and Serrano (1996) develop N -player models that generalize Rubinstein's (1982) bilateral bargaining game. In contrast, in "1-N bargaining models", only bilateral agreements are considered. One player takes the active role, attempting to strike deals with each of the other N players sequentially. Examples of such research include Horn and Wolinsky (1988) , Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Cai (2000) . Our paper is a 1-N model. It differs from the extant 1-N literature in two ways: first, the sequencing of negotiations is an important choice variable, and, second, sequencing is confidential. For example, sequencing is fixed in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Cai (2000) , and irrelevant in Horn and Wolinsky (1988) . Thus, our analysis focuses on issues in the design of negotiation strategies that transcend the simple choice of offer and acceptance strategies. In this way, our work is related to Stahl (1990) , who studies when to make an offer in two-agent bargaining situations. We consider the issue of to whom to make an offer. 1 In this sense, our basic framework is standard although the issues we address in this framework are novel.
Another dimension for classification is information structure. The literature can be divided into those papers that model symmetric information bargaining and those that model asymmetric information bargaining. In symmetric information models, all information is common knowledge. Our model specification lies at interstices between symmetric and asymmetric information models. In our analysis, players are not endowed with any private information regarding valuations or preferences. However, because the sequencing of negotiations is confidential, the player's own moves generate private information that affects the calculations of other players. The results of our analysis are consistent with standard asymmetric information models in that our model also supports inefficient equilibria in which the parties fail to reach agreement. We do not view this result as surprising in our setting as negotiation failure is driven by the same forces that produce failure in more standard asymmetric information models of bargaining.
1. Although to our knowledge this paper is the first to address sequencing uncertainty as a distinct issue, many authors have used games featuring sequencing uncertainty (i.e. where a single information set contains nodes at a varying number of moves from the root of the game tree) to illustrate game-theoretic issues. See, for example, Van Damme (1987, Figure 6.5.2) and Kreps (1990, Figure 12.12 (a) ).
Under symmetric information, conventional wisdom has held that efficient outcomes should be reached by negotiation. Recently, however, researchers have shown that symmetric information bargaining, even two-player bargaining, can also produce inefficient outcomes. Cai (2000) shows that when players are sufficiently patient, delay may emerge in a multilateral bargaining game and perpetual disagreement can occur in equilibrium when the number of players becomes large. Furusawa and Wen (1999) , in a two-player bargaining setting, produce an inefficient perfect equilibrium that is unique. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our basic framework. A numerical example is developed in Section 3. The special case of two sellers is studied in Section 4 and the extension to N sellers is in Section 5. Section 6 sketches some directions for extending the analysis and summarizes our results.
BASIC FRAMEWORK
A buyer is attempting to buy two indivisible and identical goods to complete a project. Each good is currently owned by a single seller. We normalize the value of the goods to the sellers to be 0. If both goods are acquired, then the value of the goods is 1 dollar to the buyer. If only one good is acquired, the buyer receives a value of γ . By varying γ we can capture all possible degrees of substitutability between the two goods. If γ equals 0, the two goods are perfect complements. In contrast, if γ = 1, the two goods are perfect substitutes. If γ = 1 2 , then these are independent goods as far as the buyer is concerned.
The buyer can negotiate with each individual seller only once and only through a 1-1 bargaining game. If the negotiations are public, all parties have complete information about the past negotiation deals. However, the buyer can make the negotiations confidential. In this case, the sellers do not know their positions in the negotiation sequence or the terms of the settlements between the buyer and other sellers. Finally, the buyer is able to buy out any one seller regardless of the cash he has spent in previous negotiations. This condition will be satisfied if the buyer has sufficient liquid wealth.
Each individual 1-1 negotiation is a two-period non-stationary version of an Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, Chapter 4 .2) bargaining game: the delay associated with the rejection of each offer leads to a probability of value dissipation. When value dissipation occurs, the economic value of the good falls to 0. This ends negotiations between the buyer and the seller with whom he is currently negotiating. Rejection of the first offer (made by the buyer) engenders dissipation with probability 1 − ρ; rejection of the second offer (made by the seller) engenders dissipation with probability 1. 2 This bargaining model reduces the individual 1-1 negotiation to a simple two-stage process in which the buyer makes a first offer, and a seller makes the final offer. Thus, our modelling of 1-1 bargaining allows us to focus our efforts on the area in which we make a new contribution: the interaction between 1-1 bargaining games when negotiations are confidential rather than on the well analysed but subtle issues surrounding 1-1 negotiations under asymmetric information. 3 More specifically: first the buyer makes an offer to a seller to buy her good. If the seller accepts the offer, she sells her good at the offer price, payment is made, and the 1-1 negotiation ends. If the seller rejects the offer, there is a probability 1 − ρ that the value of the good is dissipated. With probability ρ, no value dissipation occurs. In this case, the seller makes a final 2. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) is the closest formulation we have found to our set-up. This set-up is closely related to a more general set-up given in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) and to Rubinstein (1982) .
3. In a previous version of the paper, we extend our analysis by modelling 1-1 negotiations as a standard Rubinstein-Osborne stationary bargaining game. We obtain perfectly isomorphic equilibrium outcomes, although the equilibrium strategies and belief updating rules supporting these outcomes are much more complex. offer to the buyer. 4 At this point, the buyer can accept the final offer or reject it. If the final offer is accepted, the buyer purchases the good at the offer price and the 1-1 negotiation ends. If the final offer is rejected, the value of the good is dissipated with probability 1. This formulation was chosen because it is the simplest strategic model of bargaining we are aware of which leads to a non-trivial division of the gains from bargaining.
We concentrate attention on perfect Bayesian equilibria of the negotiations game. Later we restrict attention to Markovian equilibria. For reasons detailed later, our focus will be on "efficient" equilibria of the game. An equilibrium is efficient if negotiation breakdown never occurs on the equilibrium path.
TWO SIMPLE EXAMPLES
Before our general analysis of the game, we consider two simple special cases in the two-seller game. The goods are perfect complements in one case and substitutes in the other case.
Perfect complementary goods
Suppose that the goods are perfect complements, γ = 0, and that the bargaining power of the sellers (ρ) equals 1 2 . If negotiations are public, the game is easily solved by backward induction. Consider first the last seller in the negotiation sequence. Since the other seller has sold her good to the buyer, this last seller knows that if she refuses to sell her good, the buyer cannot complete the project. If the seller makes the final offer, she can demand any amount less than the full project value 1, with the assurance that her offer will be accepted. An offer more than 1 would certainly be rejected by the buyer because this renders a negative pay-off to him. Since the seller receives nothing when the offer is rejected, the seller will never ask for more than 1. Thus, the seller must receive 1 in a subgame starting with her making a final offer. Hence, when the last seller rejects the initial offer from the buyer, with probability 1 − ρ = 1 2 , the project's value is dissipated and with probability ρ = 1 2 the seller can make a final offer of 1, which will be accepted by the buyer. The expected value to the last seller from following the strategy of rejecting the buyer's offer is thus 1 2 . Rationality dictates that the last seller will accept any offer that is greater than 1 2 . The buyer's pay-off from making an offer that is rejected is zero. Thus, an offer to the seller less than 1, will, if it is accepted by the seller, produce a higher pay-off than a rejected offer. Since the buyer always prefers his offer being accepted to being rejected, the buyer must, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, make an initial offer of 1 2 to the last seller, and this offer must be accepted. Thus, meeting the last seller's demands costs the buyer Buyer's strategy. Half of the time approach seller 1 first; half of the time approach seller 2 first. Make a first offer of 1 3 to all sellers in negotiation. If the offer is rejected, accept any final offer that is less than or equal to 2 3 and 1 respectively when negotiating with the first and second seller approached.
4. In this model, offers are always made by the buyer to a particular seller and final offers by a seller to the buyer. Thus, in the subsequent analysis, we will not always specify which party is making the proposal. Given our simple bargaining set-up, this practice should not produce any confusion.
Seller's beliefs. She is equally likely to be in the first or second negotiation.
Seller's strategy. If the offer is greater than or equal to 1 3 , accept the offer; reject any offer less than 1 3 and make a final offer of 2 3 after rejection. To verify that the candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium, we will simply consider the incentives of the buyer and seller 1. The optimality of the second seller's strategies follows by symmetry. First consider seller 1's optimal final offer. She realizes that she is equally likely to be the first or last party with whom the buyer negotiates. If she demands the whole surplus, 1, such a demand will be accepted only if she is the last seller to be approached. The probability of being the last seller in the sequence is . Thus seller 1's candidate final offer strategy is optimal. Given that the final offer is 2/3 and the dissipation probability, ρ, equals 1 2 , the reservation demand of ρ 2 3 = 1 3 is also optimal for the seller. Given seller 1's reservation demand and the fact that the buyer's pay-off is 0 whenever his first offer is rejected, the buyer's first offer of 1 3 is clearly also optimal. Thus we have verified the equilibrium. Next note that the pay-offs to the buyer equal 1 − . We see that the buyer's pay-off is higher in the confidential negotiations regime.
This example shows that confidentiality can change the equilibrium outcomes of negotiations and that the sequencing strategy of the buyer in confidential negotiations can affect agent pay-offs. In the following section we will attempt to determine the range of model parametrizations that support these effects.
Substitutable goods
Suppose that the goods are substitutes, γ = 1 − ε, ε ∈ [0, 1 2 ), and that the bargaining power of the sellers (ρ) equals 1 2 . If negotiations are public, the game can be solved by backward induction. The second seller in the negotiation sequence knows that her good has marginal value of ε to the buyer because the buyer has already acquired one good. Thus the second seller is willing to accept 1 2 ε. In order to calculate the first seller's pay-off, it is necessary to determine the largest final offer that the buyer is willing to accept. Note that once the buyer rejects the final offer from the first seller, he cannot obtain the good from the first seller, but he can still attempt to acquire the good from the second seller. Given the failure of the first negotiation, the value of the good from the second seller becomes 1 − ε. Because the second seller observes the failure, she knows that she is bargaining over a larger "pie" and she will only settle for 1 2 (1 − ε). This means that the buyer's pay-off from rejecting the final offer of the first seller is 1 2 (1 − ε). Thus, the largest final offer that the buyer is willing to accept is
That is, the buyer's pay-off by accepting the final offer and then paying off the second seller is at least the same as his pay-off after rejecting the final offer from the first seller. Hence the first seller receives If negotiations are confidential, consider an equilibrium where the buyer always approaches the first seller first. Because in the equilibrium the sellers' beliefs must be consistent with the buyer's action, the second seller knows that she is in second negotiations and she is willing to accept 1 2 ε. Consider the buyer's alternative pay-off after the failure of the first negotiations. With confidential negotiations, the second seller does not learn the failure of the first negotiation, and she will accept 1 2 ε any time. This leaves the buyer with 1 − ε − 1 2 ε as his alternative pay-off. Thus the final offer from the first seller, which is acceptable by the buyer, is ε, and initially the first seller will accept 1 2 ε. Therefore, in confidential negotiations, both sellers receive 1 2 ε respectively and the buyer ends up with 1 − ε.
In this example, the inability of the second seller to revise her demands in confidential negotiations gives the buyer large bargaining leverage over the first seller. In this way, confidentiality benefits the buyer when goods are substitutes.
THE TWO-SELLER MODEL
In this section we still assume that there are only two sellers: seller 1 and seller 2. However, we drop our special assumptions regarding the degree of complementarity and the allocation of bargaining power.
Public negotiations
First consider public negotiations between the sellers and the buyer. The public negotiation game is a symmetric game of complete information with a unique solution that follows directly from backward induction. The pay-offs from this equilibrium are presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. When negotiations are public, the sequencing order has no impact on buyer pay-offs. All subgame perfect equilibria generate a pay-off of
2 ) to the first seller with whom the buyer negotiates, and a pay-off of ρ(1 − γ ) to the second seller with whom the buyer negotiates.
Note that the relative size of the pay-offs to the two sellers under public negotiations depends on the degree of substitutability of the agreements. When the agreements are complements, the second seller receives the larger payment. To understand this effect, note that, because payments to the first seller are sunk, the bargaining leverage of the second seller depends only on the marginal contribution of her agreement to the value of the project. After a successful first negotiation, this marginal contribution of the second agreement is 1 − γ . For complement goods, γ < 1 2 . Hence the second seller receives the larger payment. On the other hand, the failure of the first negotiation changes the marginal value of the second agreement from 1 − γ to γ . When the agreements are substitutes, this effect increases the value of the second agreement, and thus the bargaining leverage of the second seller. The buyer recognizes that the failure of the first negotiation, if observed by the second seller, will allow the second seller to successfully extract more value from the buyer. The first seller can use the buyer's fear to force him to make more concessions in the first negotiation. In this case, the first seller can obtain the larger payment.
Efficient confidential negotiations
Next we consider efficient equilibria under confidential negotiations. The buyer can choose between two sequencing strategies, first approaching 1 and then approaching 2 or the reverse strategy of approaching 2 first and then approaching 1. Let p ∈ [0, 1] represent the probability of following the first strategy. We call p the buyer's sequencing strategy.
Theorem 2. For any sequencing strategy p of the buyer, there exists an efficient perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The buyer's pay-off in such an equilibrium is given as follows:
Proof. We will prove the buyer's pay-off function first and then show the existence of an equilibrium. Let r i , i = 1, 2, represent the smallest buyer offer that seller i will accept in any efficient confidential negotiations equilibrium. Note that in an efficient equilibrium the buyer must make the smallest offer that the seller will accept. The seller cannot observe the play of other negotiations. Thus, the smallest offer the seller will accept is invariant to the play of other negotiations. Thus, the equilibrium offer of the buyer to a given seller is invariant to the play of negotiations with the other seller. Thus, we call the equilibrium offer of buyer i, o i , i = 1, 2. Let f i be the final offer made by seller i conditioned on the offer made by the buyer.
Let us consider the pay-offs to the buyer from the current and future negotiations with the sellers, ignoring payments on previous deals as such payments are sunk. In an efficient equilibrium, along the equilibrium path both goods are purchased. The final offer from a seller will be based on the largest amount the buyer is willing to pay. If the buyer is in the last negotiation, the buyer will be willing to pay the difference in value between one agreement and both agreements, 1 − γ . If the buyer is in the first negotiation his willingness to pay may be restricted by the payments he expects to make to the other seller. If the buyer's optimal strategy after the first negotiation fails is to continue, then his continuation pay-off after failure is γ − o , where o is the demand of the other seller. If he does not continue, then his continuation pay-off is zero. The buyer chooses the optimal continuation strategy; thus, his continuation pay-off after rejecting the seller's offer is (γ − o ) + . If the buyer agrees to the seller's demand his continuation pay-off is 1 − o less the payment to the seller. Thus, the highest acceptable demand to a buyer in the first negotiation is 1
. The seller will choose the final offer that maximizes her pay-off over the best offer conditioned on acceptance regardless of the sequencing strategy followed by the buyer, min[1 − γ , 1 − o ], and the best offer conditioned on the seller being last in the bargaining sequence. The expected pay-off from making a final offer that will only be accepted by the buyer in the last negotiation is the probability of being last, (1 − p) for seller 1 and p for seller 2, times the optimal offer, 1 − γ . Thus the expected seller pay-off from making a final offer is
where o is the offer to the other seller and p is the probability that the given seller is the last seller approached in the negotiations.
The seller will be able to make a final offer with probability ρ, otherwise dissipation will occur after a rejected buyer offer. Thus the reservation pay-off to the seller, which must equal the initial offer of the buyer, equals ρ times the expected pay-off from a final offer. Thus, the offers to sellers 1 and 2 in an efficient Bayesian equilibrium are fixed points of the contraction map,
For each fixed p, F p is a contraction map. Solving for the fixed point of this map produces a unique fixed point (o Given the sellers' strategies, the buyer is clearly better off making initial offers that are accepted than to have a low initial offer rejected and to accept a final offer later. To show that it is suboptimal for the buyer to eschew one negotiation altogether, note that the buyer's pay-off is γ − o 
Thus the buyer strategy of offering o p 1 and o p 2 to seller 1 and 2 respectively is optimal. Finally, the buyer is indifferent between the two sequencing strategies as long as he does not change his initial offers. Thus playing a mixed sequencing strategy is consistent for the buyer in the equilibrium. This concludes the proof of the existence of an equilibrium.
The distinguishing features of confidential negotiations are that (a) the seller cannot vary her demands in the second negotiation based on the outcome of the first negotiation, and (b) the seller is not aware of whether she is the first or the second seller with whom the buyer negotiates. If substitutability is small, so that γ ≤ ρ/(1 + ρ), then the failure to reach an agreement in the first negotiation renders the project value so low that it cannot support the payments demanded by the second seller. Thus, the buyer forecasts that if he fails to satisfy the first seller, he will not be able to satisfy the second. Hence, the economic value of continuation is 0 if the first negotiation fails. In this case, confidentiality eliminates the economic benefit of substitutability to the buyer. In fact, the buyer's pay-off is exactly the same as the pay-offs under perfect complementarity. Thus, substitutability, of a sufficiently limited nature, has no effect on equilibrium pay-offs in confidential negotiations.
Once substitutability becomes sufficiently great, that is, γ ≥ ρ/(1 + ρ), the situation changes and the buyer expects to pay the second seller regardless of whether he reaches an agreement with the first seller. Once the buyer's optimal continuation strategy under both acceptance and rejection of the first seller's offer includes payment to the second seller, these payments become sunk and they cease to influence the reservation offer of the buyer. Instead, the buyer's reservation value for the final offer in the first negotiation is the marginal increase in value provided by two agreements over one agreement, 1 − γ . Moreover, in the second negotiation, the reservation value of the buyer, assuming he has concluded the first negotiation successfully, is also the difference in value between two agreements and one agreement, 1 − γ . Hence, when substitutability becomes sufficiently large, the reservation demands of the buyer become independent of the negotiation sequence and the order in which the sellers are approached, and equal 1 − γ in both negotiations.
When negotiations are confidential, sequencing strategy (the choice of p) has no effect on outcomes when substitutability is high. The equivalence obtains because, for high substitutes, the marginal increment in value of the next agreement, rather than the payment to the next seller, determines the reservation demands of the buyer. As this marginal value is invariant to sequencing order, sequencing becomes irrelevant to determining equilibrium pay-offs. As the goods become less substitutable, or more complementary, prospective payments to the other seller become the binding constraint on seller demands rather than the intrinsic incremental value of an agreement. When sequencing matters, uniform sequencing, that is, setting p = 1 2 , maximizes buyer pay-offs. When p = 1 2 it is always optimal for both sellers to set their demands so that they will be accepted regardless of whether they are the first or the second seller in negotiations. The further p deviates from Buyer profits are depicted when seller agreements are substitutable in the case of two sellers. In the figure, it is assumed that seller bargaining power, ρ, equals 0·5. The horizontal axis represents the degree of substitutability between seller agreements. The vertical axis represents the pay-off to the buyer. The dashed line represents the total pay-off to the buyer from public negotiations. The upper solid line represents the pay-off from confidential negotiations under uniform sequencing of offers; the lower solid line represents buyer pay-offs under confidential negotiations featuring deterministic sequencing. The shaded area between the two lines represents buyer profits in confidential negotiation equilibria featuring other sequencing strategies trying a very high final offer that will be accepted only when the seller is the final seller in the negotiation sequence. This effect raises seller demands and thus lowers buyer welfare. Now that we have determined the buyer's pay-offs in confidential and public negotiation regimes, we can compare the results. The comparisons are provided by the following theorem. The comparison provided in the theorem is illustrated in Figure 1 . In this figure we plot the degree of substitutability on the horizontal axis and the buyer's pay-off on the vertical axis. As one can see from Figure 1 , the pay-off to the buyer in uniform confidential sequencing is always weakly higher than in sequential confidential sequencing. Public negotiations produce higher buyer pay-offs than uniform confidential negotiations over an intermediate range of agreement substitutability. In this range, the agreements are complements, but the degree of complementary is not that strong.
The intuition for the dominance of confidential negotiations if and only if agreements are strong complements or substitutes is as follows: making negotiations confidential has two effects. The first effect, which we term the prospective payment uncertainty effect, is that confidentiality, by preventing sellers from knowing their positions in the negotiation sequence, limits their ability to hold up the buyer, forcing them to moderate their demands to accommodate the possibility of large demands from sellers later in the negotiation sequence. This effect of confidentiality, which is present only when the buyer follows random negotiation sequencing ( p = 0 or 1), increases buyer pay-offs when substitutability is low. However, as soon as substitutability becomes large enough to make the first seller's demand independent of the payments to other sellers (i.e. when γ > ρ/(1 + ρ)), this source of gain from confidentiality is eliminated.
The second effect of confidentiality, which we term the valuation revision effect, is that it prevents the second seller in the negotiating sequence from modifying her demands if the first negotiation fails. When the two agreements are complements, knowledge of failure of the first negotiation makes the second seller less aggressive. This reduced aggressiveness of the second seller lowers the cost to the buyer of spurning offers made by the first seller, and this effect forces the first seller to lower her demands. When the two agreements are substitutes, if the first negotiation fails, knowledge of failure of the first negotiation makes the second seller more aggressive. Therefore, the first seller knows that an observed failure of the first negotiation will be very costly to the buyer. This effect makes the first seller more aggressive. Thus, the valuation revision effect, which prevents the second seller from changing her demands, is harmful to the buyer when the two agreements are complements and beneficial when the two agreements are substitutes. Note that this effect, in contrast to the payment uncertainty effect, requires only that the results of negotiations are confidential, not that the sequencing of negotiations is confidential.
The aggregate impact of confidentiality on buyer pay-offs depends on the interaction of the two effects discussed above. When goods are highly complementary, and the sequencing strategy of the buyer is fairly uniform ( p close to 1 2 ), the prospective payment uncertainty effect dominates. As complementarity falls, the prospective payments uncertainty effect vanishes, and the valuation revision effect becomes the determining factor. This effect yields higher payoffs for public negotiations when goods are complements and higher pay-offs for confidential negotiations when goods are substitutes.
Inefficient confidential negotiations
From the above analysis, it is apparent that interesting results for sequencing negotiations occur when goods are highly complementary. Only in this region does the sequencing of offers matter. Moreover, once sequencing does matter because of high complementarity, the pay-offs in confidential negotiations are the same as they would have been under perfect complementarity. Hence, we focus our subsequent analysis on the perfect complements case. So far we have only considered efficient equilibria. In Appendix B to this paper, we show that inefficient equilibria that feature a probability of negotiation breakdown also exist. These equilibria resemble total or partial failure of the negotiations to produce an agreement obtained in other asymmetric information bargaining models: off-equilibrium beliefs ensure that the more the informed party offers, the more the uninformed party thinks she can extract and, thus, the more she escalates her demands. This escalation makes reasonable offers by the informed party suboptimal and thus supports low offers that cannot be profitably accepted by the uninformed party. This leads to negotiation failure. 5 Because inefficiency in our analysis arises for exactly the same reasons as it does in other asymmetric information bargaining models per se, we have no reason to develop an extensive analysis of this issue. Our aim in our analysis is to determine how sequencing strategy affects buyer pay-offs, and our interest in inefficient equilibria ends once we have determined the relationship between buyer profit and sequencing strategy in these equilibria. Our next result 5. See Ausubel and Deneckere (1992) for a discussion of issues related to the effect of informed offers on the beliefs of the uninformed parties in bargaining games.
shows that in the two-player setting, all inefficient equilibria produce 0 pay-offs to the buyer. In what follows, we extend this result to the more general N -player setting.
Theorem 4. Assuming perfect complementarity (γ = 0), the buyer's pay-off in any inefficient perfect Bayesian equilibrium is 0.
Proof. First note that along all equilibrium paths the buyer's pay-off is the same. Whenever the buyer rejects a final seller's offer, his pay-off is at most 0. By sequential rationality, his payoff must at least equal 0. Thus, the buyer's pay-off must equal 0 in any equilibrium featuring a positive probability of a rejected final offer. Using the same logic, any equilibrium featuring an accepted final offer of 1, must also produce a pay-off of 0 for the buyer. Thus, we need only consider equilibria that feature a rejection of the first buyer's offer and acceptance of a final offer which is less than 1. Now if negotiations with only one of the sellers features a positive probability of failure, then the buyer is always better off by putting that negotiation first in the negotiating sequence. In this way he ensures that payments to the other seller are only made conditional on the first negotiations not breaking down. Because beliefs are consistent with strategies in equilibrium, this implies that if breakdown occurs in only one negotiation, sellers know their position in the negotiations. Consider the final offer of the seller in the first negotiation after the buyer's first offer has been rejected and dissipation has been avoided. Given that she knows that she is in first position and that the continuation pay-off to the buyer is 1 − o , where o is the offer to the second buyer in the sequence, her final offer equals 1 − o and the buyer's equilibrium pay-off equals zero. Thus, the only possible case for a non-zero buyer payoff in an inefficient equilibrium is where the first offers fail in both negotiations and the sellers respond with final offers of less than 1. If the final offer is less than 1, then the seller will lower the demand sufficiently to have it accepted by the buyer if she is the first seller with whom the buyer is negotiating. The pay-off to the buyer in the first negotiation from accepting such a demand is − f + ρ(1 − f ), where f is the seller's final offer and f is the other seller's final offer. Thus in any such equilibrium, final offers satisfy the following equations:
The solution to these equations is f 1 = f 2 = f * = ρ 1+ρ . The pay-off to the buyer is ρ(− f * +ρ(1− f * )) = 0. Thus we have shown that in every case, the buyer's pay-off is zero.
Note that it is obvious that Theorem 4 does not extend to the case of substitutable goods. A counterexample is an equilibrium in which one negotiation fails because of demand escalation and the other concludes efficiently. A second observation is that, even in the complementary goods case, Theorem 4 depends on the special structure of our bargaining game employed in this paper. We assume that once an initial buyer offer is spurned, then, if dissipation is avoided, all bargaining power passes to the seller. The seller will use this bargaining power to extract all the expected future rents from the buyer. Thus, the buyer's profits must equal 0 in any equilibrium featuring any probability of negotiation breakdown.
EXTENSION TO N SELLERS

Public negotiations
In this section, under the assumption of perfect complementarity, we extend our analysis to N sellers where N > 2. An increase in the number of sellers has two effects on our analysis. First, the complexity of sequencing strategies increases proportionally to the factorial of the number of sellers. Modelling this more complex negotiation environment requires a more formal development than we have pursued thus far. Second, when N = 2, a seller need only be concerned about prospective payments to one other seller. Since no seller can appropriate more than half of the value of universal agreement, 1·00, each seller knows that if she moderates her demands to ensure that the buyer can profitably satisfy both her demands and the demands of the other seller, she will still be able to extract significant gains in negotiations. When there are N > 2 sellers, each seller must consider payments to more than one other sellers. As these payments pile up, the final-offer strategy of making a final offer that accommodates all other sellers becomes suboptimal for each individual seller, unless that seller is almost certain she is one of the first sellers with whom the buyer negotiates. However, by rational expectations, if the buyer is uniformly randomizing, a seller cannot be almost certain that she is very likely to be near the start of the sequence. Thus the simple uniform randomizing strategies of the two-player case cease to be viable. Thus, the complex sequencing strategies permitted by the N > 2 framework are actually required to support equilibrium outcomes.
We initiate our analysis of the N > 2 case by considering public negotiations. Under the assumption of perfect complementarity, the analysis of the public negotiations benchmark case is particularly transparent.
Lemma 1. When negotiations with all N sellers are public and all goods are perfect complements, the buyer offers ρ(1 − ρ) N −i to the i-th seller in the negotiation sequence, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }. All the offers are accepted by the sellers. The buyer undertakes the project and receives a pay-off of (1 − ρ) N .
This simple characterization of the solution to the public negotiation game is useful because it acts as a benchmark for our analysis of the more complex case of confidential negotiations.
Formal definition of the negotiation game
When negotiations are confidential, only the buyer knows the sequencing of offers and the terms struck in earlier negotiations. The sellers only observe the offer they receive from the buyer. They do not observe the buyer's negotiations with other sellers. Thus, they have no direct information on the deals the buyer has struck with other sellers. The equilibrium path intersects one information set of each seller. This information set contains all possible patterns of negotiations that could have preceded the offer to the given seller.
The extension to confidential negotiations requires that we build this structure of information into a formal analysis. To this end, we need to define the points at which the buyer and the sellers take actions. Moreover, the information set for a given seller contains all paths leading to the observed offer. Systems of belief need to be defined over all paths included in each of these information sets. Strategies of the buyer in negotiations with any one seller could vary depending on the details of earlier negotiations. Thus, formally defining the behavioural strategies and information sets for all agents using the standard extensive-form game approach, is very cumbersome.
For this reason, we simplify matters by restricting attention to strategies conditioned only on relevant state variables-those state variables that directly impact the pay-off to the buyer and sellers from accepting and rejecting offers. Since the buyer is not cash constrained, the resolution of early negotiations has no impact on his incentives in later negotiations. The only feature of the game that impacts the buyer's willingness to pay is the set of sellers he still must strike deals with in future negotiations, or equivalently, the set of sellers with whom he has already struck deals.
When the sellers respond to offers from the buyer, they need to know how much they can squeeze out of him. This again depends only on the set of sellers with whom the buyer has yet to reach agreements. This is the only variable which the sellers need to form expectations about in order to formulate sequentially rational responses to the buyer's offers. Thus, to simplify exposition we will restrict attention to strategies conditioned only on the relevant state variable S, the set of sellers with whom the buyer has concluded negotiations. We will term an equilibrium satisfying this restriction a Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 6 In the game we model, the buyer starts at the initial state S = ∅, picks a seller, i, to negotiate with, and makes an offer to i. Seller i then chooses a response. If negotiations with seller i are successful, the state changes to S = {i}. The buyer then selects another seller, say j = i, to negotiate with. This process continues until S equals the set of all sellers or dissipation occurs. When an individual seller receives an offer, she is never sure of the identity or number of the sellers with whom successful negotiations have been concluded. All that the seller knows is that she is not one of these sellers; that is, seller i knows that any S which precedes her receipt of the offer does not include i. In order to calculate her pay-off, seller i forms a probability measure, possibly dependent on the offer she receives, over all states S not containing i. Along the equilibrium path, this probability measure must be determined by the actions of the buyer.
The basic framework is formalized in what follows. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N } represent the set of sellers. LetS be the complement of S, that is,S = N \ S. For any set S, let P(S), be the power set of S, that is, the set of all subsets of S. Let P − (N ) be the set of all non-empty subsets of S and let P −i (S) be the set of all non-empty subsets of S that do not contain i. If α = (α(1), . . . , α(N )) is a vector in R N and S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N }, then α(S) represents the sum of α's with indices in S; that is, α(S) = i∈S α(i).
Define a sequencing strategy as a random map σ (·) that, for each proper subset S of N , selects an element out ofS. Let H represent the set of all such sequencing strategies. Let {Ũ S, j : S ⊂ N , j / ∈ S} be a collection of 0, 1 valued independent random variables distributed over 0 with probability 1 − ρ and 1 with probability ρ. This collection represents moves of nature, which occur when a seller rejects the initial offer from the buyer. Let M represent the set of all maps m : P − (N ) × N → [0, 1]. A strategy for the buyer, η, is an ordered triple of maps (σ, γ , θ) ∈ H × M × M, such that for all S, {σ (S)} S are pairwise independent and the collection {σ (S)} S is independent of the collection {Ũ S, j }.
The interpretation of these definitions is as follows. The buyer chooses a, perhaps random, negotiating sequencing strategy, σ . For each set of sellers who have been dealt with, S, the buyer chooses a new seller i = σ (S) to begin negotiations with. In these negotiations, the buyer will first make an initial offer γ (S, i) and then choose a final offer threshold θ (S, i) for acceptable final offers. The equilibrium is Markovian in that conditioning of the strategy is restricted to the state variable S. Thus the choice is the same regardless of how the previous negotiations played out. This is a plausible restriction since the resolution of previous negotiations is never observed by remaining sellers and the outcome of these negotiations has no effect on the pay-offs or feasible strategy sets of either the buyer or the remaining sellers.
Next note that each sequencing strategy σ generates a probability that a given subset S is reached in the play of the game. For any non-empty set S in P(N ), define Perm as the set of all permutations of S. Then this probability represented by ι can be defined as follows: ι(∅) = 1, and if S = ∅,
6. The use of the Markovian equilibrium concept is common in economics and game theory. For a recent use of this solution concept, see Padilla (1995) ; for a classic treatment, see Friedman (1985, Section 4 
.2).
If S = S and S = S ∪ { j}, we say that S is reached from S via j. By Bayes rule, the probability of reaching S ∪ { j} via j from S using σ , which we represent by ι σ j (S), is given by ι
This formula follows, because every path eventually reaches j; thus the denominator in the Bayes rule calculation, S ι σ (S )P[σ (S ) = j], equals 1. When defined, the probability that seller i is reached from S after an offer of g from the buyer, given that the buyer follows strategy vector η = (σ, γ , θ), is equal to the following Bayes rule assignment:
, whenever γ (S, i) = g, and is equal to zero otherwise. The probability is not defined if
The first component of r i (g), A i (g), is the set of initial offers that i will accept, and the second component, l i (g), is the final offer made by seller i in response to a buyer offer of g.
The ordered pair (η, r ) represents the strategies of the buyer and the sellers. This ordered pair generates negotiation paths as follows.
Definition. If S and S are two subsets of N , we say that S is a successor to S(S
In other words, S = S ∪ { j} is a successor to S, if after completing negotiations with S, the buyer selects seller j to negotiate with and successfully completes negotiations with j. By stringing together successors we obtain paths through the negotiations.
Definition. For each state ω, given (η, r ), the path starting from S is the unique sequence of sets (S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S T ) defined as follows: (a) S 0 = S; (b) S k+1 is a successor of S k , k = 0, . . . , T − 1; (c) S T has no successor. We let Fi(S; η, r, ω) represent the final set in this path.
The pay-offs at the game starting at set S given state of the world ω and strategies (η, r ) are defined as follows. The pay-off of seller i, π i is defined as follows: if i / ∈ Fi(S; η, r, ω) \ S, then π i (S; η, r, ω) = 0; if i ∈ Fi(S; η, r, ω) \ S and S is the largest set on the path starting from S with the property that i / ∈ S ,
Let I be the indicator function for whether a path from S terminates in successful negotiations with all sellers. That is,
The pay-off to the buyer, starting from S, given buyer strategies η = (σ, γ , θ ) and seller strategies r , is the expected cash flow to the buyer, and is given by e(S; η, r ) = E ω I (S; η, r, ω) − i∈S π i (S; η, r, ω) .
For convenience, define the pay-off to the buyer starting from N as e(N ; η, r ) = 1.
The expected buyer pay-off from negotiations with i starting from S is given by
Sellers are unable to observe how earlier negotiations with other sellers played out or even how many other sellers have been involved in negotiations. That is, they cannot observe S. The only thing they do observe before they decide on their responses to the buyer is the offer, g, they receive. Thus, to compute rational responses, they require a system of beliefs. A system of beliefs for seller i is a probability measure, µ i (· | g), over P −i (N ) conditioned on the offer g. Let µ be the N -vector representing the beliefs of each seller. Note that if an offer to i is reached along the equilibrium path, that is, if there exists S ⊂ N such that S ∈ P −i , P[σ (S) = i] > 1 and γ (S, i) = g, we can apply Bayes rule to define µ i (· | g) using the equilibrium strategy of the buyer. In general, however, since most offers are never observed in equilibrium, Bayes rule cannot be used to completely determine a system of beliefs for sellers.
The pay-off to seller i conditional on her system of beliefs by playing response 
The pay-off to seller i, given her system of beliefs and the equilibrium strategy played by the buyer, is then given by
The above definitions allow us to define a Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the game.
Definition.
A Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a triple consisting of buyer strategies, η * = (σ * , γ * , θ * ); seller responses, r * = (A * (·), l * (·)); and beliefs {µ * i } i such that (i) (Sequential rationality-buyer) (a) Over all S ∈ P − (N ), the buyer's strategy, σ * , maximizes e(S; σ, γ * , θ * , r * ) over σ ∈ H.
(ii) (Sequential rationality-sellers) ∀i ∈ N , g ∈ [0, 1],
(iii) (Belief consistency) For all sellers i, µ * i is determined by Bayes rule using σ * whenever possible.
An efficient Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the probability of asset dissipation is zero; that is, a Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium (η * , r * , µ * ) is efficient if P[ω : I (∅; η * , r * , ω) = 1] = 1.
General characterizations of equilibria
Efficient equilibria.
Our first result in the general N -seller case, a desideratum for deriving future results, shows that verifying whether an efficient equilibrium exists can be identified with a pair of conditions regarding seller pay-off vectors, α ∈ R N , and buyer sequencing strategies. 
Since offers must lie in A i in an efficient equilibrium, the sequential rationality of the buyer strategies implies that his offer to i must equal α * (i). Next, note that if (A) holds, (B1) must hold. If this were not the case, then making an acceptable offer to the first seller negotiated with would be suboptimal, contradicting the efficiency assumption.
At paths from S to i, the buyer forecasts future payments of α * (S ∪ {i}) to sellers negotiated with after i. Thus, the reservation level of the final offer for the buyer at (S, i), θ * (S, i) is 1 − α * (S ∪ {i}). Sequential rationality and belief consistency restrictions on seller actions imply that
In other words, (B2) holds in any efficient equilibrium.
(B ⇒ A). Suppose that (B) holds for the pair σ ∈ H and α * ∈ R N . Define the following candidate equilibrium. The buyer's strategies η are given as follows: The sequencing strategy, σ * , is given by σ . The initial offer to i at state (S, i), γ * (S, i), is α * (i), for all S ∈ P −i and i ∈ N . The final offer rejection threshold is given by θ * (S, i) = 1 − α * (S ∪ {i}). Seller strategies and beliefs are given as follows:
It is easy to verify that these strategies and beliefs constitute a Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the pay-offs of sellers and the buyer are given by α * and 1 − i α * (i) as defined in (A).
The only characteristics of efficient equilibria we are concerned with are the pay-offs they produce for the sellers and buyer, determined by the vector of pay-offs to sellers α and the sequencing strategy followed by the buyer (given by σ ). Theorem 5 shows that we can determine whether an efficient equilibrium exists for given values of α and σ simply by determining whether such an ordered pair (α, σ ) ∈ [0, 1] N × H satisfies condition B of Theorem 5. This will greatly simplify the subsequent analysis.
Inefficient equilibria.
In the inefficient equilibria discussed in the previous section, the pay-off to the buyer equals zero. In fact, this result universally holds in inefficient equilibria in the N -seller case. The necessity of zero buyer profits in inefficient equilibria is obvious in confidential negotiations when a deterministic sequencing of negotiations is adopted by the buyer. In these cases, a seller, knowing her position in the negotiating sequence, can capture all value to go whenever she has the opportunity to make a final offer. A more complicated argument is necessary to establish this result when the negotiation sequence is not deterministic, because then an individual seller may not be able to make a single offer capturing all value to go. However, as we show in the Appendix, this result still holds. These observations are summarized in the theorem given below.
Theorem 6. In any inefficient equilibrium in which an initial offer is rejected with positive probability, the pay-off to the buyer equals zero.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Efficient equilibria and endogenous uncertainty
Given the above results, it seems logical to focus our attention on efficient equilibria. These equilibria are parameterized simply by sequencing strategies, σ , and seller reservation prices, α, satisfying B1 and B2 of Theorem 5. This raises a number of natural questions, one of which is how many pairs (σ, α) satisfying B1 and B2 we can find. In other words, are efficient equilibria sparse, requiring very specific sequencing strategies, or are they plentiful? Our first result is a demonstration, using a contraction mapping argument, that, for any choice of sequencing strategy σ , there exists a unique reservation price vector satisfying B2. Thus the only thing that can prevent a sequencing strategy (σ ) from supporting a unique equilibrium seller pay-off vector (α) is the failure of condition B1.
Theorem 7.
If σ is any sequencing strategy, there exists a unique α, such that (σ, α) satisfies B2.
Since the buyer's least preferred outcome produces a pay-off of zero, the previous theorem tells us that as long as we can find an equilibrium that produces a positive buyer pay-off, we can focus on condition B1 in our search for equilibria which maximize the welfare of the buyer.
The first result along this path is that, despite the fact that information is imperfect in the negotiation game because sellers do not know the sequence the buyer follows, efficient equilibria producing positive buyer pay-offs always exist. These equilibria mimic the perfect information case in that sellers accept all offers that provide them as much as the backward induction equilibrium of a perfect information game in the same equilibrium-path sequencing of offers.
Theorem 8. Let χ be any permutation of {1, 2, . . . , N }. Then a Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the negotiation game exists in which the buyer plays this strategy; i.e. the buyer follows the deterministic negotiation strategy σ (S) = arg min j / ∈S χ ( j), the sellers' pay-offs are given by α(i) = ρ(1 − (1 − ρ) N −χ (i) ), and the buyer's pay-off is given by (1 − ρ) N .
Thus, even if the sequencing of negotiations is not common knowledge, perfect Bayesian equilibria exist where sellers correctly conjecture the order in which they will receive offers. The equilibrium is supported by seller beliefs regarding their positions in the sequence of negotiations being invariant to the offers made by the buyer. Given this structure of beliefs, the buyer cannot profitably deviate from the equilibrium path. This follows because at any stage of the game, success in the negotiations requires the buyer to pay all the remaining sellers their reservation demands. Paying more to any one seller is clearly suboptimal from the buyer's perspective. Moreover, changing the sequencing of offers to the remaining sellers after completion of any stage of the negotiations does not alter the sum of the prospective payments required for successful negotiation. Thus, the buyer has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium path. A key feature of these equilibria is that, despite the ex ante symmetry between the positions of the N sellers, the equilibrium allocations they receive are asymmetric. Sellers who conjecture (correctly) that they are being negotiated with early in the process realize that the demands of later sellers reduce the incentive of the buyer to make concessions. For this reason, they rationally choose to be less tough in negotiations with the buyer.
Having verified that the set of pay-offs induced by efficient equilibria is not empty, we next turn to characterizing the range of pay-offs produced by efficient equilibria. We are especially interested in determining the upper bound on buyer profits produced by the equilibrium allocations. Note that no subgroup of agents can unilaterally deviate from an equilibrium and secure uniformly higher pay-offs. Because all members of the non-deviating subgroup must obtain their equilibrium pay-off level to prevent breakdown, and because the total pay-off is constant across efficient equilibria, resources are not sufficient to permit a deviating coalition to earn a uniformly higher pay-off. Thus, from the perspective of coalitional rationality, no efficient equilibrium is favoured. However, the buyer plays a privileged role in the game in that only the buyer is able to observe and control the entire play of the game. Conjectures by the uninformed sellers regarding the buyer's actions determine their expected pay-off. In this sense, the buyer is the focal player in the game and it seems natural to suppose that sellers' conjectures regarding equilibrium buyer strategy will centre on equilibria that maximize buyer profits. Our first result toward characterizing maximal equilibrium buyer profits is the following upper bound.
Theorem 9. In any Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium the pay-off to the buyer is no greater than
.
Proof. First note that for
This implies that, for all i ∈ N , max l∈ [0, 1] l :
Thus by B2 of Theorem 5, in all efficient perfect Bayesian equilibria, the payment to seller i is given by α(i), and α(i) satisfies, for all i ∈ N ,
Summing over i yields
Rearranging yields the result that total payments to sellers, α(N ), satisfy
As no value is dissipated in an efficient Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the maximum pay-off to the buyer is given by
In inefficient perfect Markovian Bayesian equilibria, the buyer's pay-off equals 0 by Theorem 6. This establishes the result.
The intuition behind the previous result is simply that, at the very least, a seller will obtain the expected value of following the strategy of rejecting the buyer's offer and making a counteroffer that will "accommodate" the offers of all the other sellers. What we mean by "accommodating" the other sellers is that the offer, if accepted, provides the buyer with a non-negative profit even if he still has to satisfy all the other sellers. Imposing this lower bound on the pay-off of each individual seller and then aggregating across sellers generates the upper bound in Theorem 9.
The next result shows that this upper bound on buyer profits can actually be obtained, when the bargaining power of sellers is low, by following the strategy of uniformly randomizing over all negotiation sequences. The logic behind this result is that, given uncertainty, a seller needs to conjecture where she is in the negotiating sequence to determine her pay-off from rejecting an offer. If she conjectures that she is one of the early sellers with whom the buyer negotiates, she will moderate her demands to accommodate for demands of sellers late in the negotiation sequence. If she believes that she is one of the late sellers, she can force the buyer to make her a large payment. If the seller is uncertain regarding her position in the sequence, the problem is more complex. By settling for a lower demand, one that will be accepted over a large number of potential negotiating sequences, the seller reduces the probability of rejection. On the other hand, a higher demand has a lower probability of being accepted. The seller needs to find the demand that generates the highest expected pay-off. When the bargaining power, and thus the equilibrium demands, of the other sellers are small, the low demand strategy that accommodates the demands of the other sellers is attractive to each individual seller. Furthermore, in this case the aggregate payments to sellers are less than would be required if the buyer pursued a deterministic negotiation strategy.
Theorem 10. Whenever the bargaining power of the individual sellers, ρ, is less than or equal to 1/(N − 1), equilibria featuring uniform randomization over all negotiation sequences produce the highest pay-offs to the buyer. Moreover, the buyer's pay-off in equilibria featuring uniform randomization is strictly higher than it is in equilibria featuring deterministic sequencing.
The results above highlight the utility of creating some confusion among sellers regarding the sequencing of negotiations. However, there is a limit on the utility of uncertainty in limiting the demands of sellers. As the number of sellers increases, holding the bargaining power of each individual seller fixed, uniform randomization ceases to be viable. The reason is that, as the number of other sellers that must be satisfied increases, the maximal demand that any individual seller can make and can have accepted along all negotiation sequences becomes quite small. This leads sellers to set reservation demands larger than the maximal amount the buyer is willing to pay in the early negotiations. Since all reservation demands must be satisfied to undertake the project, making such an offer is not sequentially rational for the buyer, contradicting the existence of a uniform sequencing equilibrium. Proof. See the Appendix.
As the above result demonstrates, uniform sequencing is not a viable strategy when the aggregate bargaining power of the sellers is too large. In this situation, identifying the equilibria that maximize buyer pay-offs is not easy. First note that equilibria characterized by some "class grouping" induce higher buyer pay-offs than purely deterministic sequencing. In these equilibria, the sellers are divided into classes, each containing a small number of sellers. The buyer uniformly randomizes over the order in which he approaches members of the same class but follows a strict precedence order between classes. Sellers correctly conjecture the order of their classes in the negotiation queue but have uniform probability assessments, ex ante, regarding their places in the queue relative to other class members. As, ex ante, all sellers are identical, the identity of the particular seller assigned to a class has no effect on the pay-off to the buyer. It is, of course, very relevant to sellers, as the classes early in the negotiation sequence receive lower payoffs than the last class in the queue. To see that some equilibria featuring class grouping induces a higher profit to the buyer than deterministic sequencing equilibria, simply note that grouping the first two sellers, i = 1, 2, into a class and then proceeding sequentially to negotiate with sellers 3, . . . , N produces a pay-off vector α c given by α(1) = α(2) = [ρ/(1 + ρ)](1 − ρ) N −2 and α(i) = ρ(1 − ρ) N −i , for 2 < i ≤ N . The total pay-off to the sellers using such sequencing is 2(ρ/(1 + ρ))(1 − ρ) N −2 + (1 − (1 − ρ) N −2 ), which is less than the total pay-off to sellers of 1 − (1−ρ) N produced by deterministic equilibria. 7 Thus we have established the following theorem.
Theorem 12. Equilibria featuring deterministic offer sequencing never produce buyer profits equaling the maximal profits obtainable in perfect Markovian equilibria.
Equilibria featuring class grouping produce higher pay-offs to the buyer than equilibria featuring deterministic negotiation sequences. Because the pay-offs in deterministic equilibria are identical to those obtained in public negotiations, this implies that confidentiality can increase the pay-offs to the buyer. We have not identified a general closed form solution to the problem of determining the equilibria that maximize buyer profits when seller bargaining power is high (i.e. (N − 1)ρ > 1). This is not surprising. From Theorem 5 it is easy to see that the problem of finding such equilibria can be reduced to a programming problem consisting of finding the 7. To verify that the above pay-off vectors are supported by an efficient perfect Markov Bayesian equilibrium, simply use Theorem 5. sequencing strategy and reservation value pairs (σ, α) that minimize the equilibrium pay-offs to sellers subject to satisfying condition B of the theorem. However, this programming problem is not quasiconcave and involves a very large number of variables and constraints. To produce some insight we have solved the problem numerically for the special case of N = 3 and ρ ranging from 0·5 to 0·95. The payments to the three sellers in the buyer-preferred equilibria are presented in Table 1 . 8 The first thing to note in Table 1 is that when ρ = 0·5, ρ(N −1) = 1, the uniform sequencing strategy generates the highest pay-off to the buyer and all three sellers receive the same pay-offs. This is a special case of Theorem 10. When ρ is greater than 0·5, the three sellers do not receive the same pay-offs in the optimal equilibria. For ρ from 0·55 to 0·85, two sellers receive the same pay-offs while the remaining seller obtains a higher pay-off. To understand the logic among such optimal sequencing, consider the following sequencing strategy that supports the equilibrium when ρ is 0·75.
Example. The sequencing strategy σ is
and pay-off vector α defined by α(1) = 36/71, α(2) = α(3) = 15/71.
The equilibrium sequencing strategy involves making the likelihood that sellers 2 and 3 are first in the negotiating sequence large enough to ensure that their best strategy after rejecting a buyer offer is to make demands that accommodate payment to both of the other sellers. Since the other two sellers demand 15/71 + 36/71, this produces a final offer of 1 − 15/71 − 36/71. 8 . The details of the minimization program are available on request from the authors and in the working paper version of this article.
If it were possible to find a strategy that would simultaneously induce seller 1 to also follow a final-offer strategy that accommodates the demands of the other sellers, then the lower bound on payments to sellers derived in Theorem 9 could be attained. However, given the high bargaining power of sellers, it is not possible to induce all sellers to follow strategies that accommodate payments to other sellers. The best that can be done is to induce seller 1 to make a final offer that permits one of the other two sellers to be satisfied. This demand equals 1 − 15/71 = 56/71. This post-rejection offer by the seller will be accepted by the buyer as long as seller 1 is not the first seller in the sequence of negotiations. Under σ , seller 1 is first with probability 1/7. Thus, the expected pay-off from rejection and offering 56/71 is (56/71)(6/7) = 48/71. Given bargaining power ρ = 3/4, this final offer produces the same pay-off as accepting a buyer offer of (48/71)(3/4) = 36/71.
When the bargaining power of the seller gets larger, the above sequencing strategy is no longer viable. For ρ at 0·9 and 0·95, the best sequencing strategy to the buyer is to induce one seller to accommodate the other two, the other seller to accommodate one, and the third seller to accommodate nobody. However, in this case, the buyer still benefits from introducing strategic uncertainty because the uncertainty reduces the probability that the toughest seller will actually be the last one in the negotiating sequence. This reduction in probability decreases the expected pay-off of the toughest seller from rejection and thus moderates her acceptable offer threshold. Finally, note that the buyer obtains significantly higher pay-offs in these optimal equilibria than he gets in the deterministic sequencing equilibria. This is further evidence that strategic uncertainty in sequencing is beneficial to the buyer.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyse an N -person bargaining game when the buyer has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with sellers. If the negotiations are public, the sellers' bargaining power depends on their positions in the bargaining sequence and the complementarity of the goods. For complementary goods, sellers who are negotiated with late in the sequence are in stronger bargaining positions and are able to extract a larger pay-off from the buyer. For substitute goods, the reverse is true. The pay-off to each seller depends on her position in the negotiating sequence. However, the total pay-off to all sellers, or, equivalently, the pay-off of the buyer, is invariant to the sequencing strategy. Moreover, there is no bargaining failure in public negotiations.
When the negotiations are confidential, equilibria exist in which the deal collapses and thus the Coase theorem fails to hold (i.e. bargaining leads to an inefficient allocation of resources). But there also exist efficient equilibria which feature a deterministic sequencing strategy by the buyer. However, when the number of sellers is fairly small and the goods are highly complementary, the buyer can obtain the highest pay-off by maximizing "strategic uncertainty", that is, randomizing uniformly across negotiation sequences. As the number of sellers becomes large, this strategy is no longer viable. In this case, grouping sellers into classes, which are negotiated with sequentially, produces a higher pay-off than negotiating in a fixed deterministic sequence or uniformly randomizing across negotiating sequences. Class formation can be optimal even when sellers are ex ante identical. This paper represents a first attempt to comprehend the effect of endogenous offer sequencing in confidential negotiations. This paper tackles the most tractable possible formulation featuring confidential negotiations-a formulation in which one agent, whom we call the "buyer", had (a) sole discretion over the sequencing of offers to a group of homogeneous agents, whom we call "sellers", as well as (b) a monopoly on the initiation of communication. Other formulations of endogenous-offer-sequencing problems, by building on the results in this paper, also have the potential to yield interesting insights. One interesting issue to pursue is how heterogeneity in seller bargaining power would influence the analysis. A more difficult but even more rewarding direction for extension is to permit a richer communication structure between the agents. In this paper, we assume a very specialized communication structure. Only communication by or with the buyer is permitted. No direct communications are permitted among the sellers. Developing a model that (a) permits communication among sellers but (b) still assumes that sellers observe directly their own negotiations with the buyer, will be an interesting exercise and one that will roughly fit many economic situations.
A: PROOFS OF SELECTED RESULTS
Proof of Theorem 6. Consider a dissipative equilibrium (η * , r * , µ * ). Clearly, if the final offer from a seller is rejected along the equilibrium path of this equilibrium, then, because the pay-off to the buyer along this path is zero, the pay-off along all sequences followed by the buyer must be the same by the best reply property of the buyer's strategies. Hence the buyer's pay-off equals zero.
Thus we need only consider equilibria in which the buyer always accepts the sellers' final offer. If the equilibrium is dissipative there will be a set of negotiations where the buyer's first offer is spurned and the sellers' first offer is accepted. Without loss of generality we can assume, by symmetry, that this set consists of the first m sellers. The buyer will always negotiate first with these sellers before he conducts other negotiations. This follows because, by confidentiality, the sequencing order of negotiations has no impact on the responses of sellers. However, by doing the deals that involve a possibility of dissipation first, the buyer ensures that he makes payments only in the non-dissipative negotiations. Thus, we can assume that sellers 1 though m are the first sellers negotiated with by the buyer. Next, pick one of these sellers who has positive probability of being the first seller negotiated with. Assume, again without loss of generality, that this seller is seller 1. Consider the buyer's pay-off on the equilibrium path sequence in which he makes his first offer to seller 1. The buyer's pay-off will satisfy e * (∅) = ρ(e * ({1}) − l * (1)).
Thus, e * ({1}) − l * (1) must be positive for the buyer to have a positive pay-off. Consider the alternative strategy for seller 1 of demanding l * (1) + ε in the final negotiation, where e * ({1}) − l * (1) − ε > 0 and ε > 0. As negotiations are concluded with the seller, the buyer's reservation value increases. Thus, the smallest demand the buyer will agree to from seller 1 along any negotiating sequence is e * ({1}). Hence, an offer of l * (1) + ε will be accepted by the buyer, contradicting the optimality of the final offer l * (1).
Proof of Theorem 7. We will show that for a fixed sequencing strategy σ there exists a contraction map, G σ , such that (σ, α) satisfies B2 if and only if α is a fixed point of G σ . The assertion of the theorem then follows from the contraction mapping theorem.
To establish this result first note that the sequencing strategy selected by the buyer defines a probability measure over sequences, that is, 1-1 maps from {1, 2, . . . , n} to {1, 2, . . . , n}. These sequences give the order in which the sellers are approached by the buyer. For example, if β is a sample sequence, then β(1) = 2 indicates that the first seller approached is seller 2. Then we can let I { j > i} represent the set of sequences such that j is approached after i by the buyer, that is, β −1 ( j) > β −1 (i).
Define Note that except at a finite number of mass points for the random variable −i α j I { j > i}, H i is strictly increasing in t. Thus this function attains its maximum at one of these mass points. Hence, H i has a maximum in t for each fixed α ∈ [0, 1] n . Thus, the following function is well defined:
α).
Let G σ represent the composition of the g σ i maps, that is, G σ (α) = ρ(g σ 1 (α), . . . , g σ n (α)).
It is easy to see that a pair (α, σ ) is a fixed point of G σ if and only if (α, σ ) satisfies B2. We will show that G σ is a contraction mapping. This implies that G σ has a unique fixed point, and thus establishes our result.
To see that G σ is a contraction mapping, for a given i, consider the difference
In equation (A.2), e k , k = i represents the unit vector equal to 1 in its k-th component and equal to zero otherwise. Let t * represent a point selected to satisfy the following condition: t * ∈ arg max t∈ [0, 1] H (t, α) and t * > 0.
Note that, for ε sufficiently small and positive, reacting to the increase in α to α + e k ε simply by reducing t * to t * − ε is feasible. It may not be optimal, but we do know that this policy places a lower bound on the pay-off from optimal policy. Therefore, g σ i (α) ≥ g σ i (α + e k ε) ≥ H (t * − ε, α + e k ε). Next note that by reducing t * to t * − ε, we have that
Thus, from the definition of H (expression (A.1)), we obtain
From the definition of H (expression (A.1)), we have that 0 < (g σ i (α) − H (t * − ε, α + e k ε)) < ε. This means that the derivative from the right of g σ i with respect to α k is always less than or equal to 1, whenever k = i. Because the derivative of g σ i with respect to α i equals 0, and because ρ < 1, ρg σ i is a contraction mapping. Thus, G σ is a contraction mapping.
Proof of Theorem 10. The uniform probability over sequences is generated by the strategy σ u defined by The function x → ρ[x/N ](1 − (x − 1) p(N )), x ∈ R is strictly concave. We want to show that over the set {0, 1, . . . , N } this function attains its maximum at N . Because of concavity, we need only show that the function attains a higher value at N than it does at N − Thus, we have established the existence of an efficient Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium corresponding to (σ u , α u ). The total payout to the sellers under this equilibrium equals N p(N ) = ρ N 1 + ρ (N − 1) .
Because the equilibrium is efficient, the pay-off to the buyer equals 1 − ρ N 1 + ρ (N − 1) , the upper bound on buyer pay-offs derived in Theorem 9. The payout to sellers in deterministic equilibria, as established in Lemma 1 is
Thus, the theorem will be established if we can show that payments to sellers are strictly smaller under (σ u , α u ) than they are in the deterministic equilibria. That is, we need to show that
Algebra shows that the above inequality holds if and only if
(1 − ρ) −(N −1) > 1 + (N − 1)ρ.
The above inequality follows from Bernoulli's inequality (e.g. Bartle, 1976, Exercise 5C, 36) .
Proof of Theorem 11. Note that (B2) implies that in any efficient equilibrium featuring uniform sequencing strategies, the payments to all of the sellers are the same. Let α * N represent the (common) payment made to sellers in negotiation game (ρ, N ). Note that by (MU), α N must satisfy Buyer's strategy. Make first offer of 0 to seller 1. If the offer is rejected, accept any final offer that is less than or equal to 1 − ρ. Make a second offer to seller 2; offer ρ. If this offer is rejected, accept any final offer that is less than 1.
Seller 1's beliefs.
If the offer is greater than zero, she is the second and last seller to be negotiated with. If the offer is zero, she is the first seller to be negotiated with.
Seller 1's strategy. If the offer is greater than zero, accept any offer that is greater than or equal to ρ and reject any offer that is less than ρ; make a final offer of 1 after rejection. If the offer is zero, reject the offer and make a final offer of 1 − ρ.
Seller 2's beliefs. Regardless of the offer, she is the second and last seller to be negotiated with.
Seller 2's strategy. Accept any offer that is greater than or equal to ρ and reject any offer that is less than ρ; make a final offer of 1 after rejection.
It is easy to verify that the above strategies and beliefs constitute a Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Along the equilibrium path, the buyer's initial offer to the seller is rejected, and failure occurs with probability 1 − ρ. The only way to satisfy the first seller on the first offer is to give her ρ. However, since the second seller also demands ρ, total payments from following this strategy are at least equal to 1, the entire value of the project. Thus the buyer has no incentive to change his strategy.
